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Abstract 
In recent years, there has been growing interest in secure pairing, which refers to the establishment of a secure 
connection between two mobile devices. Many published studies have described the various types of out-of-band 
(OOB) channels through which authentication data can be transferred with user control and involvement. However, 
there has been little discussion of setting up secure connections between groups of mobile devices. Some security 
protocols have been proposed, but they have tended to focus on a scenario whereby all devices must be located in one 
place to perform the association.  
In this paper, we describe a new group association method, called MobileCA. Our method is designed for a broader 
range of scenarios and does not require all devices to be in one place at one time. MobileCA extends the OOB 
channel concept and utilizes digital certification. We have implemented a prototype system using smart phone 
handsets. 
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1. Introduction 
As personal computers become more ubiquitous, a wider variety of mobile devices has come into our 
daily lives. Various technologies, including Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and ZigBee, exist to enable wireless 
communication between mobile devices. However, compared to their wired counterparts, wireless 
networks are more vulnerable to security threats, especially to eavesdropping and alteration: so-called 
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man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack [16]. It is generally assumed that the major security issues, including 
MitM attack, can be addressed if the cryptographic public key can be authenticated. In a wired network, 
authentication is essentially a solved problem, using digital certification and a trusted third party, usually 
called the certificate authority (CA). However, establishing a trusted third party among mobile devices is 
not practical, because wireless networks are usually set up on a completely ad-hoc basis, typically 
involving unfamiliar devices.  
User involvement and control in the authentication process bootstraps the problem. In this paradigm, 
an additional auxiliary channel, termed out-of-band (OOB), exists between two mobile devices, in 
addition to the ordinary wireless channel. Throughout this paper, ‘the requester’ refers to the device that is 
about to be authenticated and ‘the verifier’ refers to the device that does the authenticating. To 
authenticate the requester, the verifier receives both the cryptographic public key through a wireless 
channel and the hash of the same key (authentication data) via the OOB channel. Then the verifier 
generates another hash of the requester’s public key and checks it against the received hash data. If cross-
authentication is required, the same action is repeated in the reverse direction.  
To date, more than 20 different OOB channels have been proposed [9]. Many low-bandwidth OOB 
channels have utilized the short-authentication-string (SAS) protocol [17], which reduces the 
authentication data to 15 bits while providing a reasonable level of security. The SAS protocol can also be 
used to authenticate the public keys of both devices with a one-directional OOB channel. To elucidate 
how data are transferred via an OOB channel, we will look at two of them briefly. McCune et al. 
proposed a barcode-based OOB channel [13]. In this system, the requester encodes the authentication data 
into a two-dimensional barcode that is shown on the screen of the requester device. The verifier reads the 
barcode using a camera. Chagnaadorj et al. developed a gesture-based OOB channel [2]. The requester 
converts authentication data into gestures and displays them to the user. The user performs the gestures 
one by one with the verifier using a built-in accelerometer.  
Although there has been a lot of research in the field of secure device pairing, little attention has been 
paid to secure association of groups of mobile devices. The term ‘secure group association’ (SGA) is 
generally understood to mean that every device authenticates the public keys of other group members. If 
all necessary authentications are performed successfully, group members can determine a shared secret 
key for their collaborative interactions. SGAs can be divided into two categories: all-at-once and one-by-
one. All previous studies in the field of SGA have focused on all-at-once association. In this paper, we 
introduce a new group association method, MobileCA, which belongs to the one-by-one category. We 
assume that all mobile devices are capable of pairing using at least one OOB channel. In practice, it is not 
difficult for a mobile device to find a suitable channel among existing OOB channels. To join a group, a 
device must perform OOB channel pairing with one of the group members. On completion of this 
authentication, the verifier issues a certificate to the requester. Once the devices have exchanged 
certificates, pairing with other group members becomes automatic owing to the certification path.  
The inspiration for the MobileCA association method comes from a common drawback of OOB 
channels. Even though there are plenty of OOB channels, none of them is generally accepted, and none 
will be in the near future because they currently cannot be adapted to various mobile devices. Moreover, 
Fig. 1. OOB channel authentication 
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recent studies have found that, in real life, people tend to select different pairing methods [4], and 
furthermore, people are likely to choose different OOB channels depending on the given situation [7]. 
2. Related Work 
To date, there have been relatively few studies on SGA; however, several group security protocols 
have been proposed [5, 10, 11]. In simple terms, each device sends its public key to every other device via 
a wireless network, and thus each device generates authentication data independently. Authentication is 
successful if all of the generated data are the same. However, this approach has well-known limitations. 
First, all mobile devices must have the proper output for data to be compared. Second, checking the data 
from all devices is tedious, and becomes even more so as the number of devices increases. 
Chen et al. proposed a slightly different group association protocol [3]. Because previous methods 
were difficult to implement with large groups, they divided groups into subgroups for verification. 
However, the protocol used a barcode-based OOB channel, which required all devices to have both a 
camera and display. Moreover, subgrouping increased the burden on users.  
Recently, attempts [8, 14] have been made to apply a group protocol [10] to existing OOB channels 
and to investigate the practical usability of group association methods. However, these studies used three 
or four OOB channels, which require rich user interfaces, because most OOB channels are not suitable for 
the protocol. In addition, one of the significant findings from these studies was that many failures were 
caused by miscommunication between group members, even in a small group (of fewer than six).  
Lucero et al. developed an alternative group-formation method [12]. To form a group, each device 
must touch the next device to the right of it. This method is easy, fast, and also can prevent an adversary 
from joining. However, the issue of how to protect communication once a group has been formed was not 
addressed. 
3. Group Association Types 
In general, SGA can be classified into all-at-once and one-by-one association. Table 1 lists some of the 
characteristics of the two categories. The characteristics of SGA types are expanded on as follows: 
Table 1. Characteristics of all-at once and one-by-one associations 
Characteristics All-at-once One-by-one 
Previous Work Few None 
Proximity Required Not required 
Synchronicity Required Not required 
Device Diversity Limited Partly limited 
Scalability Weak Strong 
Group Size  Limited Unlimited 
User Involvement Full Semi-automatic 
Group Formation Dependent Partially dependent 
 
x Previous Work: There has been little discussion of SGA, and all published studies have described all-
at-once group association [3, 5, 10, 11]. The comparison in Table 1 is between these association 
protocols and our MobileCA method. 
x Proximity and Synchronicity: All group members have to be physically located in the same place and 
must participate actively and simultaneously in all-at-once group association. In contrast, as its name 
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implies, one-by-one association occurs in an incremental manner, allowing each device to join the 
group independently of the other group members and their associations. 
x Device Diversity: In the existing protocols, all group members are expected to possess the same 
physical method for verifying authentication data. For example, screens may be required [5, 11], or 
both a camera and a display may be needed [3]. In [10], even though a specific output was not 
mentioned, the protocol needed all devices to be equipped with similar interfaces so that users could 
compare authentication data. However, the verification phase of each device in MobileCA involves 
only two devices: the new device and an existing group member. Therefore, only one device from the 
group is required to be compatible with the new device.   
x Scalability: Scalability is a major disadvantage of all-at-one association. To add a new device to the 
group, all group members that are already associated must be assembled and perform the association 
together. Group association should allow for the addition of a new device without all of the existing 
devices being physically present, and MobileCA addresses this problem.  
x Group Size: As a group grows in number, all-at-once association becomes difficult to carry out and 
user effort increases considerably. Recent usability studies have shown that many failures can be 
caused by miscommunication of group members, even in small groups of fewer than six users [8, 14]. 
In contrast, the size of a group in MobileCA can grow without most of the group members even being 
aware of the growth. 
x User Involvement: Even though it is impossible to eliminate user involvement completely, group 
association should be as automatic as possible. In existing protocols, users must actively participate in 
the entire association process, whereas MobileCA requires user involvement in only n–1 pairings; the 
remaining association is automatic. Moreover, all-at-once group association is inappropriate when one 
user manages multiple personal mobile devices, because the user has to compare authentication data 
with every device. In contrast, MobileCA can be applied to both single and multiple users’ cases. 
x Group Formation: In general, the process of establishing a secure group consists of two parts: group 
association (authenticating the public keys of each member) and group formation (readying 
collaborative interactions, for example, by deciding on a shared key). These two actions should occur 
as independently as possible. Once group association has been successfully completed, all or some of 
the associated members can safely form the group at any time. However, a problem arises if 
unassociated devices are included in the group. This situation tends to happen frequently due to the ad-
hoc nature of mobile networks, and so the most efficient handling is required. All-at-once association 
must be performed again, even if all devices except one are previously associated. However, in 
MobileCA, only the new device pairs with one existing group member, and the remaining process is 
automatic. 
4. MobileCA 
In this section, we describe the MobileCA SGA method in detail. We assume that all mobile devices 
are equipped with a wireless network protocol, the installation of at least one OOB channel, and 
computational hardware that is sufficient for the basic cryptographic operations. 
4.1. Design 
Assume that Bob has several mobile devices. To protect wireless communication between his smart 
phone and laptop, he uses a barcode-based OOB channel. In addition, he establishes a secure connection 
between his smart phone and his wireless headset using a gesture-based OOB channel. He now wants to 
secure the communication channel between the laptop and the wireless headset. The following question 
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arises: must he perform OOB channel pairing, which consumes a considerable amount of time and effort 
[9] again? We believe that our method is the most appropriate to facilitate this kind of scenario.  
MobileCA has two principle aspects, which are described below: 
x Certification: Once the public key is verified using the selected OOB channel, the verifier issues a 
certificate to the requester. If the OOB channel uses the SAS protocol, both devices certify each other. 
The certificate is saved in a protected repository, called the KeyStore, on both devices. KeyStore holds 
two types of certificates: certificate entries and key entries. Certificate entries are certificates that the 
device itself has issued to other devices, whereas key entries are used to ensure the public key of the 
device and are signed by other devices. 
x Certification Path Pairing (CPP): Saved certificates are used for subsequent pairing, as shown in 
Figure 2. For instance, suppose Bob’s smart phone has already received a certificate from the laptop 
and that the headset has also received a certificate from the phone. This means that there is a 
certification path between the laptop and the headset, i.e., Cert (Laptop -> Phone) + Cert (Phone -> 
Headset). Given this, the laptop can have confidence in the public key of the headset, and so issues a 
certificate to it without OOB channel-based pairing. If cross certification is required, CPP is repeated 
in the reverse direction. 
 
Compared to a system in which every device in the group is compared with every other device, the 
effort required is reduced from O(N**2) to O(N). Saving the user time and effort is not the only merit of 
CPP, however, as it also enables the pairing of two mobile devices without a common OOB channel. For 
example, a wireless headset cannot be paired using the barcode-based OOB channel, which requires a 
camera and a display. Assume that the laptop also cannot communicate using the gesture-based OOB 
channel. Consequently, Bob can use the smart phone, which can pair using both barcode- and gesture-
based OOB channels, as a bridge between the laptop and the headset, as shown in Figure 2.  
Although CPP allows pairing of two mobile devices, this result shows the essential features of SGA. 
Using MobileCA, more than two mobile devices can possess the authenticated public keys of other 
devices. In this situation, they can easily build a secure group at any time. 
4.2. Centralized MobileCA Model 
MobileCA assumes that every mobile device is able to pair using at least one OOB channel. However, 
even if this requirement is satisfied, establishing a fully formed secure group may be impossible in some 
cases. For example, assume Bob has seven devices, as shown in Figure 3, and he wants to associate all of 
them. All possible OOB channel pairings are performed and the certificates are issued. Consider the 
following cases: 
Fig. 2. The base concept of MobileCA 
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x No matching OOB channel: For example, Bob’s camera can pair with other devices only using an 
LED-based OOB channel [15]; however, no other devices can communicate using this channel.   
x No path found: Even if there is a certification path, for example, from the iPod to the headset, CPP 
may not occur between them. This problem can be solved if CPP is carried out first either between the 
headset and the laptop or between the iPod and the phone. 
x No path at all: CPP may never be accomplished between some pairs of devices, for example, the 
printer and the laptop. 
The centralized MobileCA model can address all of these limitations. To build the centralized model, 
Bob must designate one of his mobile devices as a hubCA. This should be the device with the greatest 
computing power and the most user interfaces. All OOB channels that are to be used must be installed in 
the hubCA, whereas only one OOB channel is sufficient for the other mobile devices.  
Secure device association with centralized MobileCA will follow two general steps. First, each device 
is paired with the hubCA using the desired OOB channel, and certificates are issued. Following this, 
every pair of devices can automatically be paired using CPP, as shown in Figure 4. A device can join the 
group at any time by following these steps.  
Mobile devices may join many different groups, thus they could have more than one hubCA certificate 
in their KeyStore. It does not matter which hubCA certificate is used as long as there are certification 
paths between the two devices. Figure 5 illustrates the sequence of the CPP protocol. Two rounds are 
performed between two mobile devices: reqCont and reqStore represent objects on the requester device, 
and verCont and verStore are on the verifier side. 
Fig. 3. Limitations of MobileCA 
Fig. 4. Centralized MobileCA model 
Fig. 5. The sequence diagram of centralized CPP 
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Round 1. The requester simultaneously sends a certificate sender request (aCSR) and the 
certificates that were issued by the hubCAs (hubCert []).  
Round 2. The verifier validates the received certificates (validateCert) using its own certificates to 
the hubCAs. If all received certificates are invalid or the verifier did not certify any hubCAs, the 
verifier stops CPP (stop). Otherwise, the verifier issues a certificate (aCert) to the requester, and then 
saves it in its KeyStore (saveCertEntry ()) as a certificate entry. The requester also saves the received 
certificate in its own KeyStore as a key entry (saveKeyEntry ()). 
4.3. Implementation and Microbenchmark 
We implemented MobileCA on smart phones running the Android operating system. The prototype 
system was implemented in Java and cryptography was implemented using Bouncy Castle [1], which 
contains a lightweight cryptography API suitable for memory-constrained devices. The communication 
between devices used WLAN. 
Table 2 shows the computational overhead of the two smart phones: a Samsung Galaxy 2S (dual-core 
1.5-GHz Qualcomm Scorpion CPU with 1 GB of RAM) and a Pantech Mirach (dual-core 1-GHz 
Qualcomm Snapdragon CPU with 512 MB of RAM) for several cryptographic operations used in 
MobileCA. RSA operations were performed using 1024-bit keys. As can be seen from the table, the key 
generation consumed the most time; however, the key pair is only created when MobileCA runs for the 
first time. 
Table 2. Computational cost of the cryptographic operations 
Operations Galaxy (sec) Mirach (sec) 
RSA Key Generation 1.38 1.8 
CSR Generation 0.03 0.044 
Certificate Verification 0.019 0.023 
Certificate Generation 0.068 0.13 
5. Discussion 
Here we focus on several minor yet important concerns that have not yet been covered in this paper. 
First, MobileCA can certainly fit into an all-at-once group association. If a group of people gather and 
decide to associate their mobile devices for some collaborative interactions, they should designate one of 
their devices as the hubCA, and then complete the required steps of MobileCA. 
Second, MobileCA is the association part of our project of establishing a secure group. In the group 
formation part, we propose another protocol for a set of mobile devices to determine a shared key. 
Briefly, one device is selected as a moderator, and the other devices inform the moderator of their 
participation; then the moderator sends a generated shared key to all members safely using certificates.  
Finally, the concept that every node on a network issues certificates to other nodes without a trusted 
third party is not a new idea. It is termed a user-centric trust model, and some wired network systems that 
also have an ad-hoc nature, such as peer-to-peer or multi-agent systems, use this model. Therefore, it can 
easily be adapted to wireless networks, and the authentication essentially relies on the trust calculation. 
However, quantifying authentication is a controversial topic in itself [6]. MobileCA exploits the user’s 
involvement and control in the authentication process; thus, a validated certificate provides better 
assurance that the public key is authentic. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have described an accumulative method for associating a secure group of mobile devices, called 
MobileCA. It utilizes OOB channels and digital certificates to achieve the goal. Although MobileCA is 
straightforward and uses established techniques, it has two major advantages over existing association 
methods. First, a device can join the group at anytime, and not all group members are required to be 
physically located in the same place. Second, user involvement can be minimal since the group 
association is simplified. 
In future work, we will test MobileCA using practical group interactions such as file sharing. In 
addition, we plan to develop the method further to study alternative wireless technologies such as 
Bluetooth and WiFi Direct.  
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